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ABSTRACT 
Joko Widodo took up office as President of Indonesia barely a month after the 
Republic ratified the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. This 
momentous ratification coupled with the severe haze during his first few months 
in office, positioned haze as a priority issue for Jokowi and his administration. 
Since then, Jokowi has been proactively taking action at both the central and 
local levels. This was hoped to be a stepping stone towards better cooperation at 
the regional level. However, this was met with a somewhat contradictory state- 
ment by Jokowi in 2015 that quite firmly requested the ASEAN region to give 
him ‘three years’ to solve the haze issue. This could be taken to mean that Indo- 
nesia wanted to be ‘left alone’ to deal with fire and haze issues for three years 
without ASEAN ‘interference’. It is important to also assess this administration’s 
style of engagement with the ASEAN organization and neighbouring countries 
over haze issues, particularly Malaysia and Singapore. A thorough consideration 
of these factors would be able to provide a detailed assessment of the Jokowi 
administration’s attitude towards ASEAN cooperation over haze, and what this 
means for the broader ASEAN community. 
Keywords: Joko Widodo, transboundary haze, ASEAN, peatlands, ATHP. 
 
ABSTRAK 
Joko Widodo menjabat sebagai Presiden Indonesia hamper sebulan setelah In- 
donesia meratifikasi ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. Ratifikasi 
ini ditambah dengan kabut parah selama beberapa bulan pertama di kantornya, 
memposisikan kabut sebagai isu yang menjadi prioritas bagi Jokowi dan 
pemerintahannya. Sejak saat itu, Jokowi telah secara proaktif mengambil tindakan 
baik di tingkat pusat maupun tingkat daerah. Hal ini diharapkan dapat menjadi 
batu loncatan menuju kerjasama yang lebih baik di tingkat daerah. Namun, ini 
disambut dengan pernyataan yang sedikit kontradiktif oleh Jokowi di tahun 2015 
yang dengan tegasnya meminta kawasan ASEAN untuk memberinya “tiga tahun” 
untuk memecahkan masalah kabut asap tersebut. Hal tersebut dapat diartikan 
bahwa Indonesia ingin “ditinggalkan sendiri” untuk mengatasi masalah kebakaran 
dank abut selama tiga tahun tanpa campur tangan ASEAN. Penting juga untuk 
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menilai gaya keterlibatan pemerintah ini dengan organisasi ASEAN dan negara-negara 
tetangga mengenai isu-isu kabut asap, khususnya Malaysia dan Singapura. Sebuah 
pertimbangan menyeluruh dari faktor-faktor tersebut akan dapat memberikan penilaian 
rinci tentang sikap pemerintah Jokowi terhadap kerja sama ASEAN mengenai kabut asap, 
dana pa artinya ini bagi masyarakat ASEAN yangf lebih luas. 
Kata Kunci: Joko Widodo, kabut asap, ASEAN, lahan gambut, ATHP. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Joko Widodo took up office as President of Indonesia on 20 
October 2014, barely a month after the Republic ratified the 
ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (ATHP) 
on 16 September 2014 (Sentana & Hariyanto, 2014). This was 
significant, as the ASEAN region has been waiting for more than 
a decade for Indonesia’s ratification. While Indonesia was part 
of the initial cohort that signed the ATHP in 2002, all the other 
ASEAN states ratified the Agreement before Indonesia, with the 
Philippines marking the ninth ratification in 2010. 
With this momentous ratification as a backdrop for his new 
Presidential position, coupled with the severe haze that blan- 
keted the region during his first few months in office, haze has 
become a priority issue for Jokowi and his administration. Jokowi 
is notable to be the only Indonesian President who has gone ‘on 
the ground’ to witness for himself the haze-producing fires at the 
end of 2014 (Nazeer, 2015). And he famously declared in Sep- 
tember 2015 that in three years, the region would see the posi- 
tive results of his efforts to tackle haze (BBC, 2015). Since then, 
Jokowi has been proactively taking action at both the central and 
local levels to address the root causes of fires and haze. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH FOCUS 
The ATHP is a legally-binding mechanism for haze mitiga- 
tion under ASEAN, with the objective to ‘prevent and monitor 
transboundary haze pollution as a result of land and/or forest 
fires which should be mitigated, through concerted national ef- 
forts and intensified regional and international cooperation’ 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2002a). However, previous studies have 
pointed out that the ATHP is rendered ineffective without 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indonesia’s ratification (Florano, 2003; Letchumanan; Tan, 2005; 
Varkkey, 2016). Hence, Indonesia’s ratification in 2014 was seen 
as an important positive step towards a haze-free ASEAN. 
Indeed, Jokowi was quick to put into place several new poli- 
cies and initiatives to combat haze soon after taking office. This 
was hoped to be a stepping stone towards better cooperation at 
the regional level, now that Indonesia had ratified the ATHP. 
However, this was met with a somewhat contradictory statement 
by Jokowi in 2015 that quite firmly requested the ASEAN region 
to give him ‘three years’ to solve the haze issue. This could be 
taken to mean that Jokowi wanted to be ‘left alone’ to deal with 
fire and haze issues for three years without ASEAN ‘interference’ 
(Lim, 2015). 
Hence, this paper seeks to evaluate how far this sentiment is 
true. An important factor to consider is to what extent Jokowi’s 
efforts in managing fires and haze are complementary to the 
ATHP. Furthermore, it is important to also assess this 
administration’s style of engagement with the ASEAN organiza- 
tion and neighbouring countries over haze issues, particularly 
Malaysia and Singapore. A thorough consideration of these fac- 
tors would be able to provide a detailed assessment of the Jokowi 
administration’s attitude towards ASEAN cooperation over haze, 
and what this means for the broader ASEAN community. The 
objectives of this research are thus as follows: 
1. To take stock of the Jokowi administration’s efforts in com- 
bating haze 
2. To consider how far these efforts are complementary to the 
ATHP 
3. To analyse the Jokowi administration’s attitude towards 
ASEAN and member states over haze and cooperation in gen- 
eral 
A leader’s personality is particularly important in decision 
making on the international level (Smith, 2012). This paper uses 
the Idiosyncrasy Credit Theory to explain Jokowi’s behaviour. 
Hollander (1958) defined idiosyncrasy credit as “an accumula- 
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tion of positively disposed impressions residing in the percep- 
tions of relevant others; it is… the degree to which an individual 
may deviate from the common expectancies of the group”. In 
other words, it describes an individual’s capacity to acceptably 
deviate from group expectations. Indeed, Jokowi is known for 
his positive idiosyncrasies. One scholar has described Jokowi’s 
idiosyncrasies as follows: “Jokowi has more positive emotions 
than negative ones. He is comfortable when socialising with the 
community… he has a tendency for social affiliation and has 
more stable and organised emotions. Besides being very intellec- 
tual, he has other qualities that enable him to carry out his du- 
ties well like communication skills, decision making skills, analysis 
and finding creative solutions” (M. Situmorang, 2015). From this 
list, it is clear that Jokowi’s idiosyncrasies are largely positively 
disposed. Hence, according to the Idiosyncrasy Credit theory, 
Jokowi has the ability to accumulate considerable idiosyncrasy 
credit to enable him to deviate from the common expectancies 
of the group. In this paper, I argue that because of Jokowi’s idio- 
syncrasy credit, he is able to deviate from the common expectan- 
cies of the ASEAN organization, which is to cooperate fully with 
the ATHP. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
The results and findings of this paper are obtained through a 
thorough process of document analysis. Local and international 
newspaper articles were important primary sources for this pa- 
per. Haze being an issue that is of great concern to the Indone- 
sian public, the region, and the larger global community, progress 
on the subject is closely followed and reported in the local and 
international media, making it an invaluable source of informa- 
tion for this paper. These findings were corroborated with gov- 
ernment and ASEAN documents, think tank and other organi- 
zational reports, as well as academic articles on this subject. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESULT 
In a candid statement in September 2015, President Jokowi 
declared that he “no longer want[s] to talk about the cause of the 
problem or what is the solution. Everyone knows what needs to 
be done” (Nazeer, 2015). In this context, this section details the 
specific efforts put into place by the Jokowi administration to 
combat fires and haze in Indonesia. The Jokowi administration 
identified a multi-pronged approach to tackle the root causes of 
haze, consisting of law enforcement, fire prevention, peatland 
restoration, the One Map and moratorium of new concessions 
(M. Sembiring, 2016). 
 
FIG. 1: JOKOWI’S MULTI-PRONGED APPROACH 
 
One of Jokowi’s first acts in office was the merge the Ministry 
of Forestry and Ministry of Environment, to form the mono- 
lithic Ministry of Environment and Forestry. Before the merger, 
the Environment Ministry was in effect a ‘junior ministry’ with 
limited influence over other ministries like the Forestry Minis- 
try (Varkkey, 2016). This resulted in land use licenses being given 
out without ecological considerations (Purwanto, 2014). When 
sensitive lands like peatlands are given out without such envi- 
ronmental considerations, haze is more likely to occur because 
peatlands are highly fire-prone. With the merger, all services re- 
JURNAL 
STUDI PEMERINTAHAN 
(JOURNAL OF 
GOVERNME NT & POLITICS) 
 
 
 
 
281 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vol. 8 No. 3 
August 2017 
 
 
 
 
282 
lated to the issuance of permits could be brought under one roof 
(H. N. Jong, 2014), and due considerations can be given to 
ecological concerns before lands are released. Furthermore, it is 
hoped that the merger will improve bureaucratic coordination 
and efficiency in responding to haze and other environmental 
issues (M. Sembiring, 2015). However, due to the fact that the 
Forestry Ministry is traditional the more ‘powerful’ ministry 
(Varkkey, 2016), there are legitimate apprehensions that environ- 
mental concerns will be stifled by the more developmental- 
minded Forestry bureaucrats. Others are concerned that the 
merger would only further complicate inter-sectoral coordina- 
tion (M. Sembiring, 2015). 
There have been some visible positive outcomes of this merger. 
Soon after the unification, Jokowi formally ordered the ministry 
to tackle these permit-issuance problems. A presidential instruc- 
tion was announced in 2015 that no new development should 
occur on any peatlands in Indonesia, even those covered by ex- 
isting concessions. Previously, the moratorium put into place by 
the former premier, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, did not include 
such a clawback clause for existing concessions. This was comple- 
mented by two edicts from the ministry. However as yet, Jokowi 
has not declared a presidential decree, which would enable this 
ban to be codified in national law. Without such a decree, this 
ban will lack legal basis (Jacobson, 2016) and will merely be treated 
as ‘planning document’ or ‘suggestion’ to local authorities, where 
it is likely to be ignored (Haze Beat, 2015). 
In this vein, Jokowi established the Peatland Restoration 
Agency (BRG) in early 2016, in order to coordinate and acceler- 
ate the recovery of peatlands. This agency reports directly to the 
president. Led by a team of conservationists, it aims to rehabili- 
tate more than 2 million hectares of peat by 2019. Restoring 
peatlands is expected to increase resilience against fires especially 
during the dry season. An important step in this process is the 
mapping of burnt and degraded peatlands (A. W. Situmorang 
& Dunstan, 2016). Jokowi has also issued another presidential 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
decree to speed up the implementation of the One Map for this 
purpose, however this remains a slow process (H. N. Jong, 2016a). 
Restoration will begin in earnest in 2017 when a state budget 
will be allocated for this purpose (A. W. Situmorang & Dunstan, 
2016). Currently, the agency is focusing on determining the best 
procedures for restoring peatlands. It is in discussion with 
Malaysia’s Tropical Peat Research Laboratory (TPRL) over resto- 
ration methods (Sun Daily, 2016), but some scientists have ex- 
pressed concern over the TPRL’s preferred method of restora- 
tion which involves compacting the peat (Wijedasa et al., 2016). 
Law enforcement has also been one of the priority areas of the 
Jokowi administration in response to the haze. Jokowi in- 
structed the Environment and Forestry Ministry and the police 
to work together to revoke the licenses of companies which break 
land use and burning laws. So far, the administration has ar- 
rested executives from seven companies accused of contributing 
to the haze pollution in the region (S. Ismail & Siswo, 2015). 
The Ministry has further revoked or suspended the land-clear- 
ing licenses of 27 firms linked to land and forest fires (Arshad, 
2016). A few high-profile cases have also resulted in victory for 
the government. For example, the Supreme Court ordered palm 
oil firm PT Kallista Alam to pay $26 million in fines and repara- 
tions (Jacobson, 2016), and PT Nasional Sago Prima was ordered 
to pay an even higher sum of $91.7 million for causing forest 
fires and haze (M. Sembiring, 2016). However, there are still chal- 
lenges with regards to law enforcement, including mindsets of 
the judges themselves. Palembang pulp and paper supplier PT 
Bumi Mekar Hijau was found not guilty for causing fires on their 
land, as judges decided that there was no damage done to the 
environment as a result of the fires, and the Indonesian govern- 
ment had not experienced losses as a result of the forest fires (S. 
Ismail, 2015). In other areas, the Riau Police have issued Letters 
of Order to Stop Investigations upon 15 companies, citing a lack 
of supporting evidence (M. Sembiring, 2016). 
The Riau Police example of suddenly dropping investigations 
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is related to another deep-seated problem in fire and haze man- 
agement in Indonesia. Due to decentralization, central initia- 
tives are often overruled or downplayed by local administrators 
who do so for their own vested interests (Varkkey, 2016). Local 
military and police personnel, in classic patron-client fashion, 
have in fact been known to personally protect well-connected 
wrongdoers, very much like hired guards (H. N. Jong, 2016b). In 
an attempt to reduce such instances, Jokowi has announced that 
fire activity will be included in police and military officials’ key 
performance indicators. If the administration area of the official 
shows high fire activity, the official will be removed from his or 
her position. Likewise, if there is a decrease in fire activity, the 
official will be promoted (Humas, 2016). This may be an impor- 
tant first step towards breaking the strong patron client relations 
that have built up between such officials and businesses involved 
in land mismanagement at the local level (Varkkey, 2016). How- 
ever, while the central government does hold the power to re- 
ward and punish military and police officials, it cannot do the 
same for administrative officials, who are often also patrons and 
are only answerable to local leaders. Hence, there is still a gover- 
nance gap here which can be abused by well-connected clients. 
Getting the police and military on board nevertheless is an 
important part of fire and haze mitigation on the ground. In his 
effort to improve patrol and fire suppression response time (M. 
Sembiring, 2016), Jokowi has also set up a specialised haze emer- 
gency task force, led by the Ministry of Environment and For- 
estry. The task force in meant to better coordinate emergency 
response of the National Police, Indonesian Army, National 
Agency for Disaster Management (BNPT), Transportation Min- 
istry, and regional level task forces. This task force aims to over- 
come the weaknesses of previous efforts, which have included a 
lack of financial support and coordination with the central gov- 
ernment. For instance, in the past, fire suppression has been 
slow because permission to fly was slow to obtain. Now, with the 
central Transportation Ministry as part of the task force, permis- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
sion can be quickly and easily granted (H. N. Jong, 2015). 
As a whole, Jokowi has definitely been very proactive in put- 
ting into place new initiatives, and strengthening older ones, in 
his administration’s efforts to curb haze. It is observable how- 
ever that most of Jokowi’s initiatives have been focused on the 
central level. While promising, many of the root causes of fires 
and haze actually originate from the local level, as a product of 
the decentralization of land management and related matters 
(Varkkey, 2016). Jokowi’s clout at the local level is certainly con- 
strained by Indonesia’s decentralization laws. However despite 
these constraints, Jokowi confidently declared that his adminis- 
tration can see and end to the fire and haze crisis within three 
years. The following section thus delves deeper into this state- 
ment, discussing it within the context of ASEAN cooperation 
over haze. 
 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATION 
Certainly, all the measures that Jokowi put into place were 
done under the so-called spectre of the newly-ratified ATHP. 
Indeed, before Indonesia’s ratification, the lukewarm success of 
the ATHP in curbing regional haze was often blamed on 
Indonesia’s non-ratification. Hence, it would be timely now to 
consider to what extent Jokowi’s efforts would contribute to plug- 
ging the shortcomings of the ATHP pre-ratification by Indone- 
sia. In general, Indonesia’s prior non-ratification had limited the 
effectiveness of the ATHP in three distinct ways: 
1. Non-ratification has delayed the establishment of the ASEAN 
Coordination Centre for Haze (ACCH) and its dedicated 
Secretariat in Riau, which was supposed to be for the pur- 
poses of facilitating cooperation and coordination among the 
parties in managing the impact of land and/or forest fires in 
particular haze pollution arising from such fires (ASEAN Sec- 
retariat, 2002b). Currently, the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, 
which acts as an interim coordination centre, is crippled by 
its limited staff and location far away from the fires. 
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2. As part of the ATHP mechanism, if a serious forest fire was 
spotted by the ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre, 
neighbouring states could activate fire-fighting services and 
move in, without having to write in to the receiving govern- 
ment to get diplomatic clearance for aircrafts and permission 
from local fire services for each new case (Khalik, 2006). How- 
ever, this clause was only applicable if both countries have 
ratified the treaty. 
3. ASEAN-level initiatives have not been able to address sensi- 
tive issues like influencing Indonesian land and forest policy 
and the implementation of laws. Article 9 of the Agreement 
does call for the development of appropriate policies to curb 
activities that may lead to land and/or forest fires (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2002b), however this is only applicable to ratified 
states. 
Among the list, the ACCH was expected to be the low-hang- 
ing fruit for Indonesia to take up soon after ratification. Indeed, 
the ACCH would seem to be an ideal home for Indonesia’s haze 
emergency task force that has been set up. A home in Riau, close 
to many of the fires, would allow for more ownership and better 
coordination all around (Varkkey, 2016). However, Indonesia 
seems to be dragging its feet on this matter. While ASEAN con- 
tinues to urge Indonesia to set up the centre, Indonesia’s only 
formal move towards this thus far has been one Workshop on 
the Preparation for the Establishment of the ACCH held in April 
2016 in Jakarta (Environment Division, 2016). No further indi- 
cation has been made on when the ACCH would finally be es- 
tablished. As it is, Indonesia task force continues to be housed 
in Jakarta under auspices of the Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry. 
Not much progress has been made in terms of fire-fighting 
cooperation and assistance as well. While Indonesia’s new task 
force technically enables faster permissions for fire-fighting planes 
to be granted, this does not seem to have been extended to for- 
eign planes, even though the ATHP allows for it. Indeed, Indo- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
nesian law dictates that provinces have to declare an emergency 
before foreign countries can help (Channel NewsAsia, 2015), 
and even then, diplomatic clearance is still required. Track record 
has shown that emergencies are often declared too late (Ferguson, 
2004), when fires and haze are already out of control. For ex- 
ample, many were expecting President Jokowi to declare an emer- 
gency when he visited ground zero in South Sumatra during the 
fires in October 2015, however he did not (Soeriaatmadja & 
Chan, 2015). A somewhat disheartened statement by Malaysia’s 
Minister for Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE) ex- 
pressed this: 
“Don’t assume that just because we have something here, we 
can just bulldoze (through) anything, that when we know there 
is a fire somewhere, we can just go in on a boat or ship or truck 
or car, and cross over to the border and start doing it, we can’t 
do it like that. That’s still a foreign country and we have to deal 
with them and we must respect our neighbour’s sovereignty. We 
cannot assume that because the agreement already exists and we 
want to set up certain things, that we (can) do it whatever way we 
want to. We can’t.” (Naidu, 2016) 
The final area is in terms of addressing sensitive issues like 
policymaking and implementation. While Jokowi’s administra- 
tion has put into place many new policies pertaining to the issu- 
ance of licenses and peatland management, there has been no 
indication that any of this was done under consultation with 
ASEAN. Indeed, Indonesia’s Minister for Environment and 
Forestry, Dr Siti Nurbaya Bakar, was conspicuously absent from 
both the 2015 and 2016 Meetings of the Conference of the Par- 
ties to the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollu- 
tion. Instead, only a senior advisor on energy attended on behalf 
of the ministry (Naidu, 2016). This has doubtlessly made it diffi- 
cult for ASEAN and its member states to advise and share best 
practises on policies and implementation without the proper 
leadership in attendance for ASEAN-level meetings. Given, as 
mentioned above, Indonesia’s BRG has been seeking advice from 
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the Malaysian TPRL, however this seems to intentionally exclude 
the Global Environment Centre, a Malaysian NGO specialising 
in peatlands that is one of ASEAN’s key partners on peatland 
management (GEC, 2016). 
Hence, it can be concluded that the Jokowi administration’s 
efforts on haze mitigation has not been geared towards fulfilling 
its responsibilities under the ATHP. Instead, they seem to focus 
more on strengthening Indonesia’s ability to manage the fires 
and haze independently from ASEAN. While this is good, and 
in line with one of the ATHP’s objectives to ‘strengthen national 
capabilities’(ASEAN Secretariat, 2002a), it portrays a state that 
has grown wary of regional pressure and wants to take matters 
into its own hands. Indeed, actions like the Indonesian Minister 
not attending important ASEAN-level haze meetings would seem 
like Indonesia is deliberately making it difficult for ASEAN to 
engage with Indonesia over haze. Hence, when Jokowi stated 
that “in three years we would have solved this”, ‘we’ here can be 
taken to mean Indonesia alone, and not Indonesia and ASEAN. 
Hence, the three years could be understood as not three years of 
full cooperation from Indonesia on regional efforts, but three 
years free of regional scrutiny or pressure while it works inter- 
nally address fires and haze. 
On the government-to-government level as well, this sentiment 
remains. A spokesperson from the Malaysian MNRE explained 
that since ratification, Indonesia has in fact been more reluctant 
to engage in any bilateral activities for haze mitigation 
(Muralitharan, 2016). For example, Malaysia previously had a 
collaboration with Riau as part of the ATHP, to help with capac- 
ity-building, community training, peatland rehabilitation and 
early warning systems (Bahagian Udara, 2010; Malaysia & Re- 
public of Indonesia, 2008; New Straits Times, 2008; Varkkey, 2016). 
However, when Malaysia recently approached Indonesia to re- 
vive this collaboration in the spirit of the recent ratification, this 
was met with a resounding no (Muralitharan, 2016). Another 
MNRE official confirmed Indonesia’s extremely defensive and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
aggressive attitudes during recent ASEAN-level haze meetings 
that he attended. Furthermore, the Indonesian Environment and 
Forestry Minister recently refused to accept a meeting with her 
counterpart in Malaysia to discuss haze matters (Paramasua, 
2016). Indonesia also vehemently turned down several offers of 
fire-fighting assistance by both Malaysia and Singapore during 
the fires of 2015, with the Environment and Forestry Minister 
saying that Indonesia has things under control, and that foreign 
help would be ‘insignificant’ (AFP, 2015; Lassa, 2015)1. 
With Jokowi coming into power just weeks after Indonesia’s 
ratification of the ATHP, many in the region expected Indone- 
sia to commit to the agreement with renewed vigour (Straits 
Times, 2014). Jokowi studied forestry in university (Emont, 2016) 
and furthermore, one of Jokowi’s closest advisors is Alexander 
Sonny Keraf, a former Indonesian Environment Minister. In fact, 
Keraf was head of the delegation to ASEAN during the forma- 
tive period of the ATHP, and one of the strongest advocates for 
its ratification at home (Varkkey, 2016). Hence, Indonesia’s rati- 
fication of the ATHP in the days leading up to Jokowi’s presi- 
dency should have set the scene for the new administration to 
reinvigorate engagement with ASEAN and its member states over 
haze. 
However, it must be noted that Jokowi’s administration was 
not the administration that ratified the agreement – it was rati- 
fied under Yudhoyono’s administration, as one of his few final 
acts in office. While Jokowi has been very vocal about seriously 
resolving the haze issue within Indonesia once and for all during 
his tenure (Lim, 2015), the illustrations above indicate that Jokowi 
has little interest to do so in collaboration with ASEAN. Indeed, 
it may be argued that, considering Indonesia’s responses, ratifi- 
cation has actually made no difference at all – at the regional 
level at least. Indeed it is questionable if Jokowi would have over- 
seen a ratification of the agreement at all, if Yudhoyono did not 
push it through at the last minute. 
This actually may not be so surprising, and may not be unique 
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to the case of the haze. In fact, the early days of Jokowi’s admin- 
istration already showed tendencies that Jokowi is turning away 
from ASEAN. In a statement that can be taken to express his 
sentiment on relations with ASEAN and its member states, 
Jokowi said that “if it’s not beneficial, I won’t do it…we’ll still 
meet but not too much” (Parameswaran, 2014). This may be a 
snide jab at ASEAN’s high volume of meetings per year. True 
enough, breaking from the traditional ASEAN-wide visits once 
a new leader took office, Jokowi conducted his first foreign trip 
as premier not to a neighbouring state but to China, and visits 
to ASEAN member states did not immediately follow (Yahya, 
2015). Furthermore, apart from haze cooperation Jokowi has been 
unsupportive of other notable ASEAN initiatives like the ASEAN 
Economic Community’s goal of a single market and production 
base (Syailendra, 2015). 
This may be a way for Jokowi to forge his own path. Ever 
since the late President Suharto, Indonesian leaders have consis- 
tently placed ASEAN as an important cornerstone of their for- 
eign policy (Yahya, 2015). Yudhoyono, for example, especially 
focused on ASEAN multilateralism and regional norms promo- 
tion during his reign (Syailendra, 2015). In contrast, Jokowi’s 
presidential campaign highlighted nationalist sentiment and 
promised a more inward-looking, ‘pro-people democracy’ 
(Dlamini, 2015). Hence, this turn away from regional 
multilateralism may be Jokowi’s way of fulfilling his election prom- 
ises. Indeed, Jokowi’s eagerness to defeat haze may be spurred 
more by nationalistic concerns and his people’s well-being rather 
than by any feeling of regional responsibility. Jokowi has indeed 
displayed much concern for the local Indonesians living close to 
the haze, as his many visits to ground zero and surrounding vil- 
lages can attest (Nazeer, 2015; Soeriaatmadja & Chan, 2015). 
Another factor may be Jokowi’s political background. Jokowi 
famously rose to fame as a former Governor of Jakarta. Some say 
this rise was too fast, and Jokowi’s lack of political experience at 
the international level has meant that he is less than adept at 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
dealing with international players (Otto & Rachman, 2015). His 
relative overconfidence in relying on internal means to address 
the haze could also be due to such inexperience, and underesti- 
mation of the complexity involved in governing a sprawling coun- 
try, in contrast to the city of Jakarta. For example, as part of his 
presidential campaign, Jokowi promised a ‘mental revolution’ 
that would discard patronage for accountability and hard work 
(Hutton, 2016). Such a mental revolution is essential in ensur- 
ing the workability of some of Jokowi’s key haze mitigation poli- 
cies would work; namely those involving policy and law enforce- 
ment which rely very much on the buy-in of local officials. How- 
ever, patronage politics, which often discourage these local offi- 
cials from taking action that may not be in the best interests of 
their ‘clients’ (Blake, 2016), are notoriously hard to dismantle or 
destroy (Varkkey, 2016). 
These observations paint a clearer picture of a more complex 
idiosyncratic personality as the largely positive one described in 
the Literature Review section. While Jokowi is indeed comfort- 
able when socialising with communities in Indonesia, this com- 
munal comfort does not extend to the ASEAN community, pos- 
sibly because his own personality is constrained by his national- 
istic presidential campaign persona which focused inwards. In- 
deed, one’s political persona, especially that related to presiden- 
tial campaigns, often conflicts and constrains one’s true person- 
ality, or in this case, idiosyncrasy (Marshall & Henderson, 2016). 
That being said however, his positive qualities of intelligent deci- 
sion making and analysis, as well as finding creative solutions to 
problems did indeed come through in the novel national-level 
mechanisms that he has put into place to address haze. Jokowi’s 
haze mitigation efforts certainly stand out as compared to the 
efforts of Yudhoyono before him. However again, his campaign 
persona possibly restricts him from applying these same intelli- 
gent and creative solutions at the ASEAN level through enhanced 
cooperation over the ATHP. Despite this, the fact remains that 
Jokowi is a very positive personality, and is well-liked not only by 
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Indonesians but also by other ASEAN leaders (Bernama, 2016; 
Parlina, 2016). Hence, Jokowi’s largely positive idiosyncrasy credit, 
at the national as well as at the regional level, enabled him to 
deviate from the common expectancies of the ASEAN organiza- 
tion without much consequence. Even though there is some 
underlying negative sentiments from other member states as 
detailed above, the ASEAN organizations seems willing to adopt 
a “wait and see” attitude and give the new president a chance to 
prove himself in his independent efforts to combat haze on his 
own terms. 
 
CONCLUSION 
While the region still experienced bad episodes of haze in 
2015, 2016 has been a relatively haze-free year for Malaysia and 
Singapore. However, this may be due more to favourable weather 
than positive outcomes of Jokowi’s haze mitigation efforts 
(Reuters, 2015). For example, while there were many hotspots 
detected in several places in Indonesia in March 2016, the pre- 
vailing winds did not blow the resulting smoke over to Malaysia 
at the time (Cheng, 2016). And later in the year, there were less 
hotspots than usual in Indonesia, due to La Nina that has brought 
heavy rains. Hence, a haze-free 2016 may not be indicative of any 
success on Jokowi’s part just yet, and neighbouring countries are 
appropriately only ‘cautiously hopeful’ (Blake, 2016). 
Either way, ASEAN itself remains ever hopeful, indicating 
that it expects faster and more effective implementation of all 
other aspects of the ATHP by Indonesia once the ACCH is op- 
erational (Environment Division, 2016). Even while commenta- 
tors say that three more years ‘is ridiculous’ (Malay Mail, 2015), 
ASEAN has allowed Jokowi to deviate from expectations to fully 
cooperate with the ATHP, by tacitly acknowledged Jokowi’s 
timeline. After decades of regional pressure from ASEAN, it 
would perhaps not be entirely out of line for Jokowi, on behalf 
of Indonesia, to request (or demand) three year’s breathing space 
for the state to put its house in order without ASEAN (politely) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
breathing down its neck. Today, barely one year down the road, 
it still remains too soon to tell if the region is merely underesti- 
mating Jokowi’s capabilities to rally the nation towards a haze- 
free ASEAN in 2020. The true test of Jokowi’s progress will be 
the next El Nino drought cycle, where the lack of rains will re- 
veal to what extent Jokowi’s ambitious plans for haze mitigation 
have indeed borne fruit. 
 
ENDNOTES 
1 Indonesia did finally accept these offers of assistance, but only long after its own fire- 
fighters were overwhelmed by the out-of-control fires 
 
REFERENCES 
AFP. (2015, 8 October). Indonesia accepts international help to combat fires causing haze 
across South-East Asia. Agence France-Presse. 
Arshad, A. (2016, 11 July). Indonesia revokes or suspends land-clearing licences of 27 
firms linked to land and forest fires. Straits Times. 
ASEAN Secretariat. (2002a). ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. Re- 
trieved from http://haze.asean.org/?page_id= 185 
ASEAN Secretariat. (2002b). ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution Kuala 
Lumpur. 
Bahagian Udara. (2010). Malaysia-Indonesia Collaboration in Preventive Measures to Deal 
with Land and Forest Fires and Haze in Riau Province. Putrajaya: Department of Envi- 
ronment. 
BBC. (2015, 29 September). Indonesia ‘needs time’ to tackle haze - Joko Widodo. BBC 
News. 
Bernama. (2016, 6 August). Najib: My relationship with Jokowi is very good. The Star. 
Blake, C. (2016, 15 June). Weather May Fix Asia Haze as Indonesia Makes Scant Progress. 
Bloomberg. 
Channel NewsAsia. (2015, 18 September). Jakarta again declines Singapore haze help. 
Channel NewsAsia. 
Cheng, N. (2016, 10 March). No need to worry about haze, yet. The Star. 
Dlamini, K. (2015). How big is the room for ASEAN in Indonesia’s foreign policy under 
Jokowi? Retrieved from South Africa: 
Emont, J. (2016). Visionary or Cautious Reformer? Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s 
Two Years in Office. Time. 
Environment Division. (2016). MEDIA RELEASE: 18th Meeting of the Sub-Regional Minis- 
terial Steering Committee (MSC) on Transboundary Haze Pollution . Retrieved from 
Singapore: 
Ferguson, R. J. (2004). ASEAN Concord II: Policy Prospects for Participant Regional “De- 
velopment”. Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26, 393. 
Florano, E. R. (2003). Asssesment of the “Strengths” of the New ASEAN Agreement on 
Transboundary Haze Pollution. International Review for Environmental Strategies, 4 (1), 
127-147. 
GEC. (2016). The Peatland Programme. Retrieved from http://www.gec.org.my/ 
index.cfm?&menuid= 90 
Haze Beat. (2015, 26 October). Under-fire Jokowi prepares biggest shift yet in Indonesian 
JURNAL 
STUDI PEMERINTAHAN 
(JOURNAL OF 
GOVERNME NT & POLITICS) 
 
 
 
 
293 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vol. 8 No. 3 
August 2017 
 
 
 
 
294 
 
haze. Mongabay. 
Hollander, E. (1958). Conformity, status, and idiosyncrasy credit. Psychological Review, 
65(2), 117-127. 
Humas. (2016). President Jokowi will Replace the Officials with Many Forest Fire Cases . 
Retrieved from 
Hutton, J. (2016, 11 March). Is Indonesia’s pro-reform leader learning the art of the 
doable? Christian Science Monitor. 
    Ismail, S. (2015, 30 December). PT Bumi Mekar Hijau found not guilty by Indonesian 
court of causing forest fires in Sumatra. Channel NewsAsia. 
Ismail, S., & Siswo, S. (2015, 18 September). Indonesia decision on haze help up to 
jokowi. Channel NewsAsia. 
Jacobson, P. (2016). How is Indonesian president Jokowi doing on environmental issues? 
Retrieved from 
Jong, H. N. (2014, 8 November). Ministry to stop granting permits for forest use. Jakarta 
Post. 
Jong, H. N. (2015, 6 September). Haze task force set up. Jakarta Post. 
Jong, H. N. (2016a, 22 July). One Map Policy’s success hinges on local involvement. Jakarta 
Post. 
Jong, H. N. (2016b, 9 September). Plantations get military, police backup. Jakarta Post. 
Khalik, A. (2006, 14 October 2006). ASEAN ups pressure on haze as lawmakers bicker. 
Jakarta Post. 
Lassa, J. A. (2015). Indonesia’s Haze and Disaster Governance Deficit . Retrieved from 
Singapore: 
Letchumanan, R. Overview and Implementation of the ASEAN Agreement on 
Transboundary Haze Pollution. Paper presented at the Powerpoint Presentation. 
Powerpoint Presentation retrieved from 
Lim, I. (2015, 4 October). DPM: Three years too long a wait for Indonesia to solve haze 
problem. Malay Mail. 
Malay Mail. (2015, 2 October). Analysts pin haze on Jokowi weakness in decentralised 
system of government. Malay Mail. 
Malaysia, & Republic of Indonesia. (2008). Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Government of Malaysia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on Col- 
laboration in Preventive Measures to Deal with Land and Forest Fires and Haze in Riau 
Provinceq. Jakarta. 
Marshall, P. D., & Henderson, N. (2016). Political Persona 2016 - An Introduction. Persona 
Studies, 2(2), 1-18. 
Muralitharan, J. (2016). Government-Academics-Industry round-table discussion. Paper 
presented at the 10th 7-SEAS International Workshop of Technologies and Sciences 
on Transboundary Haze, ANGKASA, Kuala Lumpur. 
Naidu, S. (2016, 11 August). ASEAN adopts roadmap for transboundary haze-free region 
by 2020. Channel NewsAsia. 
Nazeer, Z. (2015, 7 September). Indonesian President Joko Widodo goes to haze’s ground 
zero. Straits Times. 
New Straits Times. (2008, 6 June 2008). Malaysia to help Riau ‘clear the air’. New Straits 
Times. 
Otto, B., & Rachman, A. (2015, 23 July). Political Strains Test Indonesian Leader. Wall 
Street Journal. 
Paramasua, M. (2016, 12 October) Malaysia as a Middle Power for the Environment 
(Follow-Up)/Interviewer: H. Varkkey . Putrajaya. 
Parameswaran, P. (2014, 18 December). Is Indonesia Turning Away From ASEAN Under 
Jokowi?. Pakistan Defence. 
Parlina, I. (2016, 10 September). Jokowi, Duterte firm friends. Jakarta Post. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Purwanto, E. (2014, 4 November). Environmental values of forest resources. Jakarta Post. 
Reuters. (2015). Efforts to Stop Indonesian Haze Fires May Not Work for 2016. Jakareta 
Globe. 
Sembiring, M. (2015). Here Comes the Haze, Yet Again: Are New Measures Working? 
Retrieved from RSIS: 
Sembiring, M. (2016). Combating Haze: Holding One’s Breath A Year On . RSIS. 
Sentana, I. M., & Hariyanto, J. (2014, 16 September). Indonesia Ratifies Regional Pollu- 
JURNAL 
STUDI PEMERINTAHAN 
(JOURNAL OF 
GOVERNME NT & POLITICS) 
 
 
 
 
295 
tion Treaty as Haze Spreads to Neighbors. The Wall Street Journal.    
Situmorang, A. W., & Dunstan, I. (2016). Work of The Indonesia Peatland Restoration 
Agency Gains Momentum. Retrieved from 
Situmorang, M. (2015). Orientasi Kebijakan Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia di bawah 
Pemerintahan Jokowi-JK. Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional, 11(1), 67-85. 
Smith, C. (2012). Personality in Foreign Policy Decision-Making. Students. Retrieved from 
http://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/16/personality-in-foreign-policy-decision-making/ 
Soeriaatmadja, W., & Chan, F. (2015, 30 October). Heavy rain clears haze as Jokowi ar- 
rives in S. Sumatra. Straits Times. 
Straits Times. (2014, 8 September). Ratification of Asean haze agreement a historic step 
in tackling problem: Malaysia PM Najib Razak. Straits Times. 
Sun Daily. (2016, 2 April). Idonesia to test M’sian peatland compaction method to pre- 
vent forest fires. Sun Daily. 
Syailendra, E. A. (2015). Consensual Leadership in ASEAN: Will It Endure Under Jokowi? 
Retrieved from Singapore: 
Tan, A. K. (2005). The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution: Prospects for 
Compliance and Effectiveness in Post-Suharto Indonesia. N.Y.U. Environmental Law 
Journal, 13, 647-722. 
Varkkey, H. (2016). The Haze Problem in Southeast Asia: Palm Oil and Patronage . Lon- 
don: Routledge. 
Wijedasa, L. S., Jauhianen, J., Kononen, M., Lampela, M., Vasander, H., LeBlanc, M.-C.,... 
Varkkey, H. (2016). Denial of Long-Term Issues with Agriculture on Tropical Peatlands 
will have Devastating Consequences. Global Change Biology (online first). 
Yahya, T. (2015, 1 June). Has Jokowi put ASEAN on the sidelines? Jakarta Post. 
